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Commentary
PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY OF
SUPREME COURT NOMINEES: A
VIEW FROM THE UNITED
KINGDOM©
KATE MALLESON*

The questioning of Supreme Court nominee Justice Marshall
Rothstein before an ad hoc parliamentary committee in March 2006 was
a momentous event in Canadian constitutional history. It was followed
with great interest by many common law countries who are also
grappling with the problem of how to ensure greater transparency and
accountability in the selection of their increasingly powerful judges
without undermining judicial independence. A key recurring theme in
these debates is whether Supreme Court judges should be subjected to
public scrutiny either before or after their appointment by the
legislature. For many countries considering such a procedure, the
experiences of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee confirmation
hearings have cast a long shadow. The criticisms provoked by the
questioning of Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas, in particular, have
undermined the reputation of such hearings around the world. Concerns
about the U.S. precedent loomed large in the recent Canadian debate
on judicial appointments. Perhaps because the powerful neighbour is
geographically closer and thus much more familiar, these concerns were
subject to more critical scrutiny in Canada than they had been
elsewhere.
This scrutiny reveals that the danger public questioning poses to
threatening judicial independence and invading candidates' privacy is
perhaps over-stated. The fact that a small number of high profile
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hearings in the United States have attracted criticism does not mean
that the system itself is inherently flawed. In reality, most Senate
confirmation hearings are relatively restrained affairs; indeed, they have
sometimes been criticized for verging on the bland. However, the
weaknesses of the confirmation process that currently occupy
academics, judges, and politicians in the United States are much less
about the content of the hearings than the political manipulation of the
procedure leading to excessive delays and leaving judicial posts unfilled.1
Furthermore, even if the hearings in the United States have sometimes
degenerated, there is no reason to assume that this would necessarily be
replicated elsewhere. Perhaps the best-known feature of the U.S.
constitutional system is that its Supreme Court occupies a uniquely
important place in the constitutional order. As a result, U.S. Supreme
Court judges are not regarded as jurists occupying a place where they
must be shielded from the "hurly-burly" of political life. Recently,
Sandra Day O'Connor rightly reminded U.S. politicians that there are
limits to the pressure which judges can take if judicial independence is
to be preserved.' However, those limits are clearly much less tightly
drawn in the United States than in any other common law country.
Another criticism of public hearings for. judicial candidates is
that they undermine the quality of the judiciary by deterring first-rate
candidates from coming forward and facing public scrutiny. No doubt
the anecdotal evidence to support this is real and some individuals have
been put off by the process. Yet it seems clear that where public
hearings are used, the deterrent effect is not sufficient to affect the
overall quality of the judiciary. In South Africa, for example, the
introduction in 1996 of public interviews of constitutional court and high
court judges by the Judicial Service Commission (a body which includes
politicians) led to widespread fears that good candidates would not
apply. This did not happen, and the quality of the Constitutional Court
is widely regarded as being extremely high.3 Moreover, South African

' M. Tolley, "Legal Controversies over Federal Judicial Selection in the United States:
Breaking the Cycle of Obstruction and Retribution over Judicial Appointments' in K. Malleson &
P. Russell, eds., Appointing Judges in an Age of JudicialPower (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2006).
2 Sandra Day O'Connor, "Address"(Georgetown University, 9 March 2006) [unpublished].
' K. Malleson, "Assessing the Performance
Commission" (1999) 116 S.A.L.J. 36.

of the South African Judicial Service
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judges are generally supportive of the system of public interviews,
believing that it gives them an opportunity to strengthen public
confidence in the court. Likewise, U.S. judges, although they certainly
would not claim to enjoy the hearings, have often gone on record in
support of the process as a means of enhancing their legitimacy. Public
interviews can also offer the less obvious advantage of allowing judges to
reveal certain information about themselves in a controlled
environment. For example, in 1999, Justice Edwin Cameron, an openly
gay member of the South African high court and a highly respected
judge, informed the Judicial Services Commission that he was living with
AIDS at his interview for a post on the Constitutional Court His
subsequent appointment undoubtedly reinforced the commission's
reputation for making non-discriminatory appointments.
While these examples show that public nomination or
confirmation hearings do not automatically undermine judicial
independence, invade candidates' privacy, or deter good candidates
from applying, the risk of these outcomes cannot be dismissed
altogether. Thirty years ago, most commentators in common law systems
would have concluded that such risks were not worth the benefits in
terms of increased openness and accountability. However, in light of the
changing role of the judiciary, the cost-benefit equation has now tipped.
Around the world the. political power of supreme court and
constitutional court judges has grown in line with the increasing
importance of human rights in the political process. Judges today are
dealing with sensitive political issues that repeatedly arise in different
countries. These include abortion rights, gay rights, aboriginal/minority
rights, the death penalty, and anti-terrorism measures. Across a range of
different countries, with varied court structures, the general pattern has
been remarkably similar. While the level of judicial activism has ebbed
and flowed within each jurisdiction, the overall trend is one of
expanding influence. In some countries, including Canada, South Africa,
the United Kingdom, and New Zealand, the change has come through
the formal incorporation of a bill of rights. In others, such as Australia,
it has been through the development of rights within the common law.
Either way, supreme courts throughout the common law world have
been given, or taken on, a role in political areas previously outside their
4 F. Du Bois, "Judicial Selection in Post-Apartheid South Africa" in K. Malleson & P.
Russell, eds., supra note 1, 292.
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remit. There is no reason to believe that this trend will reverse in the
foreseeable future. Indeed, if anything, the process of judicialization is
likely to accelerate as more countries expand the scope of justiciable
rights to include social and economic rights in areas such as housing,
health, and employment. The wide range of rights found in documents
such as the South African constitution and the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union is likely to be more frequently included
within new bills of rights or inferred into old ones.5
If this development continues on its current trajectory, courts
throughout the common law world will increasingly be called upon to
determine what obligations governments have to provide for their
citizens in a wide range of policy areas. Sometimes the courts may take a
strongly deferential line and leave elected governments a wide measure
of discretion on these issues; at others times, they may be more activist
and impose obligations that have significant policy and economic
implications. Sometimes, as in the seminal South African Constitutional
Court decision in 2000 concerning the rights of children to shelter, they
may come up with imaginative ways to uphold basic rights and leave the
politicians to determine exactly how these are to be implemented.6
Whatever the particular outcome in individual cases, such issues are
now more likely to find their way into the courts for their resolution.
Supreme court justices are not politicians in wigs; rather, they play a
crucial role in the interpretation and development of human rights
standards around the world. They now make up a global community of
jurists who meet at conferences and read each others' judgments,
speeches and articles via the internet.7 They are a powerful body of
decision-makers whose judgments affect the lives of many citizens in
many different states.
Against this background, the traditional point of balance
between accountability and independence of the judiciary must now be
rethought. Citizens have a right to be properly informed about the
people who sit in their top courts and determine controversial issues of
great moral and political sensitivity. Judges at this level cannot demand
the anonymity- of earlier years, hiding behind literal or metaphorical

' See C. Guarnieri & P. Pederzoli, The Power ofJudges (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002).
6

South Africa v. Grootbroom, [2000] S.A.J. No. 57 (S. Afr. Const. Ct.).

7

See A.M. Slaughter, "A Global Community of Courts" (2003) 44 Harv. Int'l L.J. 191.
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wigs. If we accept that some form of public questioning of supreme
court candidates or appointees by elected representatives is necessary to
provide a link to the democratic process and greater public engagement
with the judicial appointments process, then there are strong arguments
for the legislature as the best forum for this process.
The argument for legislative hearings must be placed in the
context of the decision in a number of common law countries to reduce
or remove the power of the executive in appointing senior judges. The
desire to curb the power of the executive in this area is understandable;
as the power of the judges grows, the danger of inappropriate political
patronage with a place on the Supreme Court bench as a reward for past
judgments or anticipated future ones inevitably increases. Partisan
political concerns will not, of course, be absent from a hearing before a
legislative committee, but the involvement of a number of MPs from
different parties ensures that no one ideological position will inevitably
dominate.
In Canada, it is clear that the impetus for the introduction of
hearings was as much driven by party considerations as by principle. For
the Conservatives, scrutinizing judicial nominees holds out the promise
of checking judicial activism. Conversely, questioning before a liberally
minded parliamentary committee might be a means of checking the
nomination of an extreme conservative. Clearly it would be naive to
expect that party politics could be removed from the equation, but its
presence does not undermine the sound principled reasons for the
change. Moreover, the composition of a cross-party legislative
committee will change from appointment to appointment, thereby
ensuring that the political persuasion of the court cannot be so easily
moulded over time to the interests of one political party. The array of
different interests that will be found on such a committee facilitates a
more effective and safer means of addressing the democratic deficit
than exclusive appointment by the executive. The fact that
parliamentary proceedings in different jurisdictions are now increasingly
televised and accessible worldwide via the internet also means that the
proceedings can be conducted in public in a very real sense.
The decision in Canada to introduce legislative hearings for the
Supreme Court nominees has attracted particular attention in the
United Kingdom because it coincides with the complete reform of the
judicial appointments process. Under the ConstitutionalReform Act
2005, the responsibility of selecting the judges for the new Supreme
Court in the United Kingdom has been passed from the Lord
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Chancellor to a new judicial appointment commission made up of
judges and members of the regional judicial appointments commissions
of England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. While the legal
and political cultures of the United Kingdom and Canada differ in
detail, many of the debated issues around judicial appointments in the
two countries are strikingly similar. The key difference is that whereas
Canada favoured accountability, the United Kingdom moved to a
system that prioritizes independence at the cost of democratic input.
During the passage of the Constitutional Reform Bill in the United
Kingdom, a number of witnesses, including myself, argued before the
parliamentary Constitutional Affairs Select Committee that one way to
counter the democratic deficit caused by the removal of the executive
from the appointments process would be to develop a role for the
legislature. The decision of the United Kingdom to reject this option,
and of Canada to adopt it, is somewhat paradoxical given that Canada
has no tradition of judges appearing to give evidence before legislative
committees; by contrast, this is a common and increasingly popular
practice at Westminster.
The first Canadian nomination hearing, as might have been
expected, was successful. The questions were sometimes searching, but
never intrusive, and the session achieved its aim of giving the public
some sense of Justice Rothstein's views and values. Of course, the
spotlight was on the committee, and the members of parliament were on
their best behaviour. But the success of the first hearing bodes well,
particularly since the committee sought to establish the parameters of
acceptable questioning, taking evidence from a constitutional expert on
the subject and making clear that judges should not be asked about
issues which might come before them at the Court. There is no
guarantee that MPs will stick to these rules in all subsequent hearings.
Some future sessions may indeed give the candidates a rougher ride.
Still this is not an inevitable cause for concern. The nature of the
questions asked will differ according to the particular candidate, as
Justice Rothstein himself noted when asked what sort of questions he
thought should be put to nominees. What is relevant must be
determined on a case-by-case basis. In some instances it may be
appropriate to ask searching questions which may be uncomfortable for
the candidate. In hindsight, it is less obvious whether the questioning of
the U.S. nominee Clarence Thomas regarding allegations of sexual
harassment was as inappropriate as many critics claimed it was at the
time.
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Canada has reason to be proud of leading the common law
countries in the area of judicial appointments reform by seeking to
increase accountability through the introduction of legislative hearings.
The decision in the United Kingdom not to take this route is unlikely to
cause any public disquiet for the time being, because the majority of the
public in the United Kingdom knows little about judges and even less
about the system by which they are appointed. However, this will change
once the new United Kingdom Supreme Court is created in 2009, with
its own building in Westminster Square, and the Supreme Court justices
are in a much closer position to their Canadian counterparts.
Journalists, academics, and politicians will become more aware of this
powerful institution, and questions will be asked about the way its
members are chosen. The failure to address the democratic deficit in the
selection process to the Supreme Court is likely to become increasingly
problematic. If the new system in Canada is seen to be successful, having
avoided the failing of the U.S. system, the United Kingdom and other
countries which have rejected this option to date may well change their
minds. Canadian MPs should be aware that they are being watched with
great interest around the world to see if they can strike that difficult
balance between rigorous and informative questioning on the one hand,
and respect for personal privacy and judicial independence on the other.

